My current research is in the philosophy of time. As I see it, the central question in the philosophy of time is: to what extent are space and time analogous? For example: it seems obvious that there is no fundamental, absolute distinction between one point of space and all others- every point of space is on a par, metaphysically speaking. Is time analogous with space in this respect, or is one instant of time- namely, the present- metaphysically special? Second: there is no variation across space in what exists, in the sense that the statement that I exist (for example) is equally true at every point of space, even points that don’t contain me. Is time analogous with space in this respect, or do things genuinely come into and go out of existence over time? Third: there is no variation across space in how things are, in the sense that the truth of the statement that I am happy (for example) doesn’t depend on where one is: if the statement is true, then it is equally true at every point of space. Is time analogous with space in this respect, or do things genuinely gain and lose properties as time passes?
In my research I defend a theory of time- the moving spotlight theory- according to which (i) there is a fundamental, absolute present time, (ii) there is no genuine change over time in what exists, but (iii) there is genuine change over time in how things are.
At the moment I am working on a number of research papers based on parts of my thesis. In ‘There is no such thing as presentism’ (see the Writing section above), I advance the controversial argument that there is no meaningful way of expressing the relatively popular temporal thesis of presentism, according to which (as it is usually put) ‘always, everything is present’. More generally, I argue that the standard way of characterising theories of time in terms of things being ‘past’, ‘present’, and ‘future’ is defective. I develop an innovative and elegant new way of characterising theories of time. In ‘McTaggart, then and now’ (see the Writing section above), I describe and dismiss J. M. E. McTaggart’s (1908) influential argument against the view that there is an absolute present time. In particular, I show that modern versions of the argument are no better than the original version.